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After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) many countries in the 
region radically liberalized their foreign trade regimes in the 1990s. In particular preferential 
trade liberalization in the CEE countries has been promoted by the European Union in the 
form of the association agreements that involved “vertical” trade liberalization between the 
EU and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to this the CEE countries 
liberalized trade “horizontally” among themselves in the form of sub-regional and bilateral 
free trade agreements. In this paper, we use the generalized gravity equation estimated on 
bilateral trade data for ten CEE countries during the period of 1993-2004 to evaluate the 
effectiveness of preferential trade liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe. We find that 
all forms of preferential trade liberalization positively contributed to the expansion of trade of 
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I. Introduction 
Preferential trade liberalization has become a major feature of the global trading system during 
the past fifty years. The limited ability to achieve far reaching multilateral trade liberalization under 
the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has led to the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the world 
economy. Following WTO terminology, the term regional trade agreement encompasses reciprocal 
bilateral free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) as well as multicountry agreements.
1    
  The first wave of regionalism was triggered by a  group of Western European countries 
following  the  1957  Treaty  of  Rome  establishing  the  customs  union  that  later  evolved  into  the 
European Union (EU) and created a network of preferential trade agreements with other partners. In 
the 1990s the EU played also an active role in sponsoring trade liberalization in Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries that during the communist rule remained isolated from the rest of the 
world for almost fifty years. 
The bilateral association agreements (the so-called Europe Agreements) concluded between 
particular CEE countries and the EU were intended to support their economic reforms and prepare 
them  for  eventual  EU  membership.  These  efforts  culminated  in  two  subsequent  waves  of 
enlargement to the East in 2004 and 2007. In addition to trade liberalization with Western Europe, 
CEE countries liberalized trade among themselves by creating a matrix of bilateral and sub-regional 
free trade agreements. 
The theoretical literature does not offer clear predictions concerning the effectiveness of 
various forms of preferential trade liberalization. On the one hand, it is argued that accession to the 
multi-country agreement should be more effective than the creation of a bilateral trade agreement. 
This may be due to the fact that in the former case trade liberalization often takes the form of a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” offer while in the latter case tariff formation may be subject to lobbying of 
                                                 
1 In a free trade area all members eliminate barriers to trade in goods among themselves, but each member retains the 
right to maintain different barriers on non-members, while a customs union goes beyond a FTA by establishing a 
common external tariff on all trade between members and non-members.   3
organized groups of interest seeking for protection (for instance Grossman and Helpman, 1994).  
On the other hand, it is argued that bilateral trade  agreements are  easier to negotiate as fewer 
partners  are  involved  in  the  negotiations.  Therefore,  this  paper  attempts  to  verify  empirically 
whether institutionalized trade liberalization is more effective compared to trade liberalization on 
the bilateral basis. 
In  this  paper  a  generalized  gravity  model  is  used  to  study  the  trade  effects  of  the  EU-
sponsored  trade  liberalization  in  the  CEE  countries  as  well  as  the  effects  of  preferential  trade 
liberalization among themselves. In contrast to previous studies it is found that both the Europe 
Agreements and various sub-regional and bilateral trade agreements were effective in promoting 
trade of the CEE countries.  
Two main strands in the empirical literature employing the gravity models in the context of 
Central and Eastern European countries can be distinguished. The first strand that emerged in the 
early 1990s concentrated on estimating the trade potential of CEE countries and predicting the 
volume of their trade flows with the West. The most commonly cited examples that belong to this 
strand include Wang and Winters (1991), Hamilton and Winters (1992), Baldwin (1994), Gross and 
Gonciarz (1996), and Piazolo (1997).
2  
The second strand that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s focuses on evaluating the 
ex-post effectiveness of trade liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe. However, most studies 
that belong to the second genre take into account only the trade effects of the Europe Agreements 
and almost completely neglect the intra-CEE agreements concluded by particular countries in the 
region. This in turn may lead to the biased estimates of the parameters on the variables capturing the 
effects of the EU association agreements. The two notable exceptions include studies by Adam et 
al. (2003) and De Benedictis et al. (2005). 
                                                 
2 These studies find that initially high unexploited trading potential of Central and Eastern Europe quickly eroded as a 
result of adjustment in trade flows that took place in the early 1990s. See Brenton and Manzocchi (2002) for the review 
of this literature.   4
 Adam et al. (2003) explore the effectiveness  of two sub-regional trade agreements: the 
Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA). They find 
that both agreements were effective in stimulating trade among the CEE countries, however, the 
BAFTA agreements turned out to be more effective than CEFTA. Moreover, the effects of the 
Europe Agreements were smaller than either BAFTA or CEFTA. In general, the authors conclude 
that all agreements were trade creators for their members.        
In a more recent study De Benedictis et al. (2005) do not distinguish between BAFTA and 
CEFTA and use in their estimating equation only a single dummy variable for all regional trade 
agreements concluded among the CEE countries. They find that while sub-regional FTAs increased 
bilateral exports between the CEE countries the Europe Agreements had no impact on their exports 
to the EU. They explain this puzzling result by the fact that starting from the end of the 1980s trade 
between the CEE countries and EU-12 was already intense because the reduction of trade barriers 
had already taken place and there was not much left to liberalize in the 1990s.    
Our study is related to the second strand in the empirical literature on the effects of trade 
liberalization  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  with  several  key  differences.  First,  to  study  the 
effectiveness of particular trade agreements, a generalized gravity equation is used. Second, the 
potential  effects  of  various  bilateral  trade  agreements  concluded  by  the  CEE  countries  among 
themselves  as  well  as  with  countries  located  outside  the  region  are  controlled  in  estimating 
equations.  Third,  in  addition  to  the  average  estimates  of  the  effects  of  preferential  trade 
liberalization in CEE countries for the whole group, estimates for the particular countries in the 
region are presented.  
Section 2 provides a brief overview of preferential trade liberalization in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Section 3 discusses the analytical framework used for evaluating the effects of preferential 
trade liberalization in the CEE countries together with the definitions of variables and the data   5
sources used in our empirical study. In Section 4 the estimation results are discussed. The final 
section summarizes and concludes with directions for future research. 
II. Preferential Trade Liberalization in the CEE Countries 
This  section  discusses  three  different  forms  of  preferential  trade  liberalization  in  CEE 
countries that include: i) trade liberalization with an already existing trade bloc such as the EU or 
EFTA, ii) the creation of a new sub-regional free trade area such as BAFTA or CEFTA, and iii) 
bilateral free trade agreements concluded by particular CEE countries among themselves as well as 
with other countries outside the region.  
The ultimate goal of joining the EU has been the major factor shaping foreign trade policies 
in the CEE countries throughout the 1990s. The EU concluded the Europe Agreements with the 
majority of the CEE countries in the first half of the 1990s. 
These agreements aimed at establishing a hub-and-spoke free trade area covering industrial 
products and granting some preferences to agricultural goods between the CEE countries and the 
EU  over  a  maximum  period  of  ten  years.  The  trade  components  of  the  Europe  Agreements 
overshadowed and extended the Generalized System of Preference status granted by the EU to most 
CEE countries in the early 1990s.
3 By January 1, 1997 the EU eliminated practically all tariffs on 
imports from the CEE countries with the exception of agricultural and “sensitive” products.   
Although trade parts of the Europe Agreements with some CEE countries entered into force 
on  different  dates  ranging  from  1992  (former  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary  and  Poland)  to  1997 
(Slovenia), schedules of elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on industrial products had one 
important element in common. They all had to be completed by the target date of January 1, 2002.  
                                                 
3  Unilateral  trade  liberalization  with  the  CEE  countries  was  initiated  by  the  EU  immediately  after  the  fall  of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1990 the EU granted the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) status 
to Hungary and Poland, in 1991 to Bulgaria and former Czechoslovakia, and in 1992 to three former Soviet republics: 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Slovenia retained the preferential status for its exports into the EU under the so-called 
autonomous  trade  preferences  granted  to  former  Yugoslavia  in  the  1980  Cooperation  Agreement.  The  GSP  status 
significantly improved access of exporters from the CEE countries to the EU markets, especially for industrial products. 
GSP preferential rate embraced 63 percent of all CN tariff lines in EU imports with most of them subject to zero rates. 
However, at about the same time a list of “sensitive” products was created. In fact these products were produced by 
industries in which the comparative advantage of the CEE countries was the strongest.   6
However, the real liberalization of trade in agricultural goods between the EU and the CEE 
countries did not take place until two waves of enlargement of the EU to the East in 2004 and 2007 
despite some previous efforts to liberalize trade in agricultural products that were limited to a small 
number of selected products. Only since then the CEE countries have been able to participate fully 
in the EU Single Market.    
In addition to trade liberalization with the EU the CEE countries liberalized in the early 
1990s  their  trade  also  with  other  Western  European  countries  that  were  the  members  of  the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – another major trade bloc in Europe, although much 
smaller in size and much less integrated than the EU.
4 The bilateral free trade agreements between 
the CEE countries and the EFTA member states were patterned on the trade parts of the Europe 
Agreements as far as the scope and timing of trade liberalization are concerned.
5  
At about the same time when the Europe Agreements were signed the CEE countries started 
to liberalize trade also among themselves. Their efforts resulted in a matrix of sub-regional and 
bilateral agreements that were supposed to complement trade liberalization with Western Europe. 
The most important of these was the Central European Free Trade Area established by former 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.  
The CEFTA agreement was signed on December 21, 1992 and entered into force on March 
1, 1993. The initial CEFTA agreement eliminated tariffs on approximately 40 percent of industrial 
goods. Trade in industrial goods and some agricultural products was liberalized further through a 
                                                 
4 In 1992 most EFTA countries signed an agreement with the EU establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) that 
entered into force in 1994. This agreement created a free trade area covering trade in industrial goods and most services 
as well as liberalized the movement of labour and capital between EFTA and the EU. Through the EEA agreement the 
EFTA countries can participate in the EU Single Market. The exception was Switzerland which concluded a separate 
bilateral agreement with the EU. In 1995 three EFTA countries: Austria, Finland and Sweden that jointly accounted for 
more than 50 percent of EFTA’s output joined the EU. However, this EU enlargement did not change much the trade 
relations between the old and the new EU member states, except for trade in agricultural products, because trade in 
industrial products was liberalized earlier. 
5These agreements covered  mainly trade in industrial products as  well as some  marine and processed agricultural 
products. Similar to the EU Association Agreements also the EFTA agreements implied asymmetric trade liberalization. 
These agreements opened the EFTA markets to imports from the CEE countries faster than the CEE markets to EFTA 
products.  
   7
series of additional protocols, mostly signed in 1994 and 1995. By 1996 almost 80 percent of the 
CEFTA trade in industrial products were free of tariffs. By 1999 tariffs were abolished on almost all 
industrial products except a minor list of “sensitive” products. The CEFTA membership gradually 
expanded  overtime  to  include  Slovenia  (1996),  Romania  (1997),  Bulgaria  (1999)  and  Croatia 
(2003).  
The  CEFTA  agreement  was  initially  supposed  to  include  also  three  newly  independent 
Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that emerged from the former Soviet Union after its 
collapse in 1991. However, these three countries at about the same time when the CEFTA was 
created decided to establish their own Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA) whose scope and pace of 
trade  liberalization  were  different  from  the  CEFTA.  The  BAFTA  agreement  was  signed  on 
September 13, 1993 and entered in force on April 1, 1994.
6 Many BAFTA and CEFTA members 
signed bilateral trade agreements in subsequent years. 
In addition to bilateral and sub-regional trade liberalization among the CEE countries these 
countries also participated in a number of bilateral preferential trade agreements concluded with 
other countries located both in the Middle East as well as in South-Eastern Europe. 
Most agreements were signed by the CEFTA members with Israel and Turkey in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s once these two countries concluded new Association Agreements with 
the  EU.
7  In  addition  to  that  the  Balkan  members  of  the  CEFTA  concluded  also  a  number  of 
agreements with neighbouring Balkan countries: Albania and Macedonia. The Baltic states also 
concluded bilateral free trade agreements with Turkey, and Estonia also a separate preferential trade 
agreement with Ukraine. 
                                                 
6 In contrast to CEFTA, BAFTA did not increase its membership but the coverage of the agreement was increased over 
time at a faster pace than in the CEFTA member states. In particular, by January 1, 1997 BAFTA included not only 
industrial but also agricultural and fish products. In this way BAFTA became the first free trade area in the region that 
provided for completely liberalized trade in these economically sensitive areas. Significant differences in the pace and 
the coverage of trade liberalization between the BAFTA and the CEFTA member states did not allow creating a single 
free trade area that would embrace all the CEE countries before their accession to the EU. 
7 The new EU association agreement with Turkey established a customs union with the EU that entered into force in 
1996.   8
III. The Analytical Framework and the Data Sources   
To  study  the  impact  of  free  trade  agreements  on  bilateral  exports  and  imports  of  the  CEE 
countries a generalized gravity equation of bilateral trade flows is used. The gravity equation has 
often been utilized to evaluate effects of FTAs on trade flows. However, most previous studies use 
simple gravity equations derived from theoretical models that assume complete specialization in 
production. In our view, the estimates of the effects of FTAs obtained using such models may be 
biased due to the lack of controls for factor proportions that play a key role in the determination of 
trade flows in the incomplete specialization models. In particular, in the case of CEE countries, 
where agriculture still plays an important role in the economy, models assuming that all trade takes 
place in different varieties of manufactured products do not seem plausible. Therefore, our gravity 
model, besides the standard gravity-type variables (such as size of and distances between trading 
partners) and various controls includes the land-labor ratio (T/L) to account for differences in factor 
endowments.  
  The dependent variables used in the estimations are bilateral exports and imports of ten CEE 
countries that joined the EU in the two subsequent waves of enlargement to the East. These include 
five Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, 
three  Baltic  states:  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  and  two  South-Eastern  European  countries: 
Bulgaria and Romania.  
  Our main explanatory variables include dummy variables indicating the Europe Agreement 
as  well  as  dummy  variables  indicating  various  intra-CEE  bilateral  trade  and  sub-regional  trade 
agreements discussed in detail in Section 2 that were in force for the time span covered by our 
sample. In addition to this in our study we control also for potential effects of other preferential 
trading agreements concluded by the CEE countries. These include bilateral agreements concluded 
with the EFTA member states, the Mediterranean countries as well as the South Eastern European 
countries. Moreover, we also control for the potential effects of the EU enlargement in 2004 by   9
including two special dummy variables for trade between the old EU-15 and the new member states 
(NMS) as well as for trade among the new member states. 
The  trade  flows  data  comes  from  the  single  source  UN  COMTRADE  database  and  is 
expressed in the constant US dollars in 2000 prices. The sample covers 149 trading partners of the 
CEE countries in the period of 1993-2004.
8 The country size is measured using the data on trading 
partners’ GDPs expressed in constant 2000 US dollars and evaluated in the PPP terms to assure 
their cross country comparability. The GDP and the land-labor ratios come from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators 2006 (WDI). 
  The  remaining  control  variables  include  proxies  for  transportation  and  transaction  costs. 
Distance between trading partners is measured as simple geographic “as the crow flies” distance 
between their capital cities and is expressed in kilometers. We also control for the existence of a 
common  border  and  common  language  between  trading  partners  and  colonial  ties
9.  Control 
variables data comes from the CEPII database available online.  
IV. Empirical results 
In this section two sets of empirical results based on estimating equation (1) are presented that 
include the average estimates for the whole CEE sample as well as the estimates obtained separately 
for particular CEE countries. 
The estimation results obtained for bilateral imports of the CEE countries using different 
estimation methods are in Table 1. The baseline estimates obtained using the fixed effects estimator 
                                                 
8 The sample choice was determined by data availability. The sample is limited downwards because of the political 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia in 
1992 and the ‘velvet’ divorce between the Czech and Slovak Republics that earlier constituted the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic. This yields a total of over 11 thousand observations in the case of exports and almost 10 thousand in 
the case of imports for the whole sample. The sample was limited to countries with population over 200 000 inhabitants. 
9 In our context a colonial relationship applies to the former parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the Soviet Union.   10
for the whole sample including all the CEE countries with individual time effects for particular 
years are in column (1).
10 
The estimation results indicate that both the agreements with Western European countries: 
the Europe Agreements and the EFTA agreements, as well as sub-regional intra-CEE agreements: 
BAFTA, CEFTA and bilateral agreements concluded between the members of BAFTA and CEFTA 
were effective in stimulating imports of the Central and East European countries. Interestingly, the 
accession to the EU of the CEE countries did not seem to contribute to the increase in their imports. 
The evidence for bilateral agreements is not clear cut. While the agreement concluded with Turkey 
appear to have increased bilateral imports of the CEE countries the estimates for other agreements 
are either not statistically significant or display negative signs.   
The robustness of the fixed effects estimates is subsequently investigated in columns (2)-(4) that 
display the estimation results obtained alternative estimation techniques. In column (2) we present 
estimation results obtained using the random effects estimator. In column (3) we control separately 
for fixed effects for the reporting and the partner countries instead of controlling for the common 
country-pair  fixed  effects.  Finally,  in  column  (4)  potential  endogeneity  of  trade  agreements  is 
controlled  for  using  the  Hausman-Taylor  estimation  technique.  Unlike  in  specification  (1),  we 
obtain estimates for time-invariant controls that are roughly in-line with intuition
11.  
The estimation results obtained for the Europe Agreements are robust with respect to the estimation 
method.  In  all  cases,  estimation  results  demonstrate  that  the  Europe  Agreements  significantly 
contributed to the increase in bilateral imports of the CEE countries from the EU member states.  
                                                 
10 The F-tests for time specific effects confirm the appropriateness of including time dummies for particular years of our 
sample in all estimated regressions for the whole CEE sample.  
11The median dummy for the common colonizer variable is 2.878, which would indicate roughly 17-fold increase in 
trade due to effects due to colonial links. We have to keep in mind that many countries in our sample constituted the 
Soviet Union before 1989 and the trade linkages between them still remain strong (in particular, this applies to the case 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).    11
Table 1. The panel data estimates for bilateral imports of the CEE countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  FE  RE  2FE  HT 
         
GDP Partner  1.80***  0.93***  1.72***  1.19*** 
  (0.098)  (0.024)  (0.15)  (0.040) 
GDP Reporter  1.28***  1.25***  1.44***  1.82*** 
  (0.12)  (0.044)  (0.17)  (0.074) 
T/L Partner  -0.58***  -0.086**  -0.44***  -0.19*** 
  (0.14)  (0.038)  (0.17)  (0.062) 
T/L Reporter  -0.89***  -0.74***  -0.88***  -0.70*** 
  (0.11)  (0.068)  (0.14)  (0.089) 
Distance    -0.74***  -1.21***  -0.62*** 
    (0.050)  (0.043)  (0.090) 
Colonial relationship    0.43  -0.37***  0.38 
    (0.48)  (0.091)  (0.87) 
Common colonizer    2.88***  1.32***  4.30*** 
    (0.26)  (0.097)  (0.46) 
Contiguity    1.28***  0.46***  1.36*** 
    (0.26)  (0.054)  (0.46) 
Common language    0.77*  0.49***  1.38* 
    (0.46)  (0.094)  (0.82) 
NMS-EU15 Integration  0.15  0.30***  0.15**  0.14 
  (0.094)  (0.094)  (0.066)  (0.091) 
Intra NMS Integration  -0.48***  -0.39**  -0.35***  -0.46*** 
  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.095)  (0.15) 
Association Agreement  0.66***  0.83***  0.49***  0.71*** 
  (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
FTA EFTA  0.85***  0.88***  0.46***  0.83*** 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12) 
CEFTA  0.39***  0.61***  0.073  0.42*** 
  (0.10)  (0.098)  (0.061)  (0.100) 
BAFTA  0.97*  1.09***  2.34***  1.08** 
  (0.52)  (0.41)  (0.14)  (0.51) 
FTA with Turkey  0.76***  0.94***  0.75***  0.83*** 
  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.18) 
FTA with Israel  -0.14  0.13  -0.22*  -0.058 
  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.22) 
FTA with Croatia  -0.66  -0.68  -0.71***  -0.71 
  (0.77)  (0.78)  (0.11)  (0.75) 
Baltics/CEFTA FTA  0.21*  0.58***  0.51***  0.31*** 
  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.066)  (0.11) 
FTA with Albania  0.33  0.48  -0.69  0.44 
  (0.63)  (0.64)  (0.59)  (0.62) 
FTA with Macedonia  -1.41***  -1.01***  1.11**  -1.40*** 
  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.45)  (0.38) 
FTA with Ukraine  0.53  0.75  -0.13  0.36 
  (1.05)  (0.88)  (0.18)  (1.03) 
Constant  -67.7***  -38.8***  -61.2***  -60.0*** 
  (2.38)  (1.21)  (3.17)  (2.12) 
         
Observations  9950  9950  9950  9950 
R-squared  0.37  0.62  0.80   
FE F-stat.  19.6***       
Sargan-Hansen    407    127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The empirical evidence obtained for intra-CEE trade agreements is also fairly robust. While 
the country-pair fixed effects estimates suggest that all agreements concluded by the CEE countries 
significantly  increased  their  bilateral  imports,  the  CEFTA  variable  loses  its  previous  statistical   12
significance when the double-fixed effects are used. Also, the estimation results obtained for the 
agreements with other countries turned out to be robust with respect to the choice of the estimation 
method. The Sargan-Hansen test favors, however, the fixed effects estimation method.    
The corresponding estimation results for bilateral exports of the CEE countries obtained 
using different estimation techniques are in Table 2. Similar to the case of imports the fixed effects 
estimates suggest that both the Europe Agreements and the EFTA agreements as well as intra-CEE 
sub-regional  and  bilateral  trade  agreements  concluded  between  the  BAFTA  and  the  CEFTA 
members  contributed  significantly  to  the  development  of  exports  in  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries. Interestingly, unlike in the case of imports, the accession of the CEE countries 
to the European Union contributed to the increase in their exports to the old but not the new EU 
member  countries.  Other  trade  agreements  were  not  statistically  significant  except  for  those 
concluded with Turkey. Similar to the estimation results obtained previously for bilateral imports, 
the results obtained for both the Europe Agreements and the intra-CEE agreements remain robust 
with respect to the choice of the estimation method. As in the case of imports, the country-pair fixed 
effects remains the preferred estimation method. 
It is worth noting that the estimated parameters obtained for the intra-CEE agreements were 
always higher than those for the Europe Agreements. Moreover, the coefficients obtained for the 
BAFTA were always much higher than those for the CEFTA which can be explained by the faster 
and the bigger scope of trade liberalization in the Baltic states than among the Central European 
countries that did not liberalize trade in agricultural products completely until their entry into the 
EU in 2004. 
To see what actually drives our empirical  results for the whole sample our sample was 
disaggregated into sub-samples for particular CEE countries and the gravity equations for their 
bilateral exports and imports were estimated separately for each country using the fixed effects   13
estimator. The estimation results for bilateral imports of the individual CEE countries are in Table 3 
while bilateral exports are in Table 4 (both tables are placed in Appendix). 
Table 2. The panel data estimates for bilateral exports of the CEE countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  FE  RE  2FE  HT 
         
GDP Partner  0.76***  0.71***  0.74***  0.82*** 
  (0.089)  (0.020)  (0.15)  (0.025) 
GDP Reporter  1.98***  1.23***  1.98***  1.68*** 
  (0.11)  (0.037)  (0.17)  (0.057) 
T/L Partner  0.25**  0.023  0.34**  0.042 
  (0.12)  (0.031)  (0.14)  (0.038) 
T/L Reporter  0.14  -0.26***  0.23  -0.067 
  (0.10)  (0.060)  (0.15)  (0.070) 
Distance    -1.15***  -1.78***  -0.99*** 
    (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.057) 
Colonial relationship    0.52  0.049  0.65 
    (0.42)  (0.093)  (0.53) 
Common colonizer    2.21***  1.89***  2.88*** 
    (0.22)  (0.089)  (0.28) 
Contiguity    0.67***  0.13**  0.75*** 
    (0.22)  (0.052)  (0.28) 
Common language    0.58  0.24***  0.86* 
    (0.40)  (0.090)  (0.50) 
NMS-EU15 Integration  0.40***  0.53***  0.48***  0.43*** 
  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.079)  (0.090) 
Intra NMS Integration  -0.015  0.046  0.24**  -0.0072 
  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.15) 
Association Agreement  0.44***  0.48***  0.23***  0.44*** 
  (0.068)  (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.066) 
FTA EFTA  0.58***  0.52***  0.070  0.59*** 
  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.12) 
CEFTA  0.46***  0.55***  0.62***  0.48*** 
  (0.100)  (0.094)  (0.063)  (0.099) 
BAFTA  1.70***  1.13***  1.18***  1.61*** 
  (0.51)  (0.38)  (0.14)  (0.51) 
FTA with Turkey  0.49***  0.51***  0.49***  0.49*** 
  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
FTA with Israel  0.071  0.16  0.15  0.077 
  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.22) 
FTA with Croatia  0.61  0.65  0.35**  0.67 
  (0.75)  (0.75)  (0.17)  (0.75) 
Baltics/CEFTA FTA  0.42***  0.51***  0.89***  0.42*** 
  (0.10)  (0.099)  (0.080)  (0.10) 
FTA with Albania  -0.15  0.085  0.66***  -0.12 
  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.14)  (0.62) 
FTA with Macedonia  -0.16  0.22  1.40***  -0.14 
  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.41)  (0.38) 
FTA with Ukraine  -0.038  0.74  0.27  0.052 
  (1.03)  (0.82)  (0.19)  (1.02) 
Constant  -56.3***  -29.2***  -41.7***  -43.4*** 
  (2.16)  (1.02)  (2.62)  (1.68) 
         
Observations  11017  11017  11017  11017 
R-squared  0.4  0.69  0.80   
Fixed effects F-stat.  14.0***       
Sargan-Hansen    120***    16.1*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   14
  The  Europe  Agreements  were  found  to  increase  significantly  imports  of  all  the  Baltic 
countries: Estonia,  Latvia, and  Lithuania together with Romania and Bulgaria. The same result 
applies also to the EFTA agreements in the case of the Baltics. Interestingly, the accession to the 
European  Union  resulted  in  increased  imports  of  Hungary  and  Slovenia  only.  The  estimates 
obtained  for  the  intra-CEE  agreements  were  not  statistically  significant  for  most  countries.  In 
particular, the CEFTA agreement turned out to be statistically significant for only Poland, Romania, 
and Bulgaria while the BAFTA agreement was not significant at all. Moreover, of all the bilateral 
agreements concluded between the BAFTA and the CEFTA member states only the agreements 
concluded  by  Slovenia  were  statistically  significant.  The  estimation  results  obtained  for  other 
bilateral agreements were statistically significant only for Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland and 
only in the case of the agreement with Turkey. 
  The estimation results obtained for bilateral exports of the particular CEE countries are in 
columns  (1)-(10).  Similar  to  the  results  obtained  for  imports,  it  was  found  that  the  Europe 
Agreements were effective only in stimulating exports of the Baltic states: Estonia and Lithuania as 
well as Romania and Bulgaria. The results obtained for trade agreements concluded with the EFTA 
member countries show statistical significance for Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. The CEFTA 
agreement contributed to the expansion of exports in six member countries: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic,  Hungary,  Slovenia,  Poland  and  Romania.  The  BAFTA  agreement  was  statistically 
significant  only  for  Estonia.  The  bilateral  agreements  between  particular  BAFTA  and  CEFTA 
countries were statistically significant for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia. The results 
obtained for bilateral agreements with other countries were positive and statistically significant only 
in the case of the agreement concluded between Poland and Turkey.   
V. Concluding remarks 
Trade liberalization in the CEE countries has been effective. Institutionalized trade liberalization on 
average  has  been  more  effective  in  stimulating  trade  than  bilateral  free  trade  agreements.  In   15
particular, trade liberalization with the EU in the form of the Europe Agreements is on average 
effective in raising both bilateral imports and bilateral exports of the CEE countries to the EU. 
Moreover, estimates for bilateral imports are higher than for bilateral exports. This result can be 
explained by the initially higher trade barriers in the CEE countries compared to the EU states.  
At the same time, our results show significant heterogeneity among the CEE countries with 
respect to the timing and the scope of trade liberalization. Estimation results for particular CEE 
countries demonstrate that the positive effect of the Europe Agreements was driven by trade with 
Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states. The lack of impact of the Europe Agreements on trade 
flows of Central European countries can be explained by the fact that these countries had been 
enjoying a preferential access to the EU markets since the early 1990s. Our results show that small 
countries are likely to expand trade through liberalization towards larger trade partners. The EU-15 
trading block was a natural trading partner for the CEE countries after the reorientation of trade 
towards the West. 
Finally, entry of the CEE countries into the EU provided a new stimulus for trade expansion 
between the old and the new member states. However, due to the data constraints our empirical 
evidence is limited to the effects of first Eastern Enlargement in 2004. Trade effects of the EU 
enlargement  to  the  East,  especially  those  of  the  second  enlargement  in  2007,  deserve  closer 
attention in future studies. Another topic for future research is the trade effects of the European 
Monetary Union enlargement to the East.    16
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Table 3. The fixed effects estimates for bilateral imports of particular CEE countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  Bulgaria  Czech Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovak Republic  Slovenia 
                     
GDP Partner  0.79**  1.54***  3.25***  2.11***  2.49***  4.38***  0.75***  1.55***  2.11***  0.81*** 
  (0.34)  (0.25)  (0.50)  (0.27)  (0.44)  (0.47)  (0.24)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.29) 
GDP Reporter  1.87***  4.36***  2.24***  1.09***  0.72**  -1.07*  1.52***  3.54***  2.22***  -0.030 
  (0.55)  (0.71)  (0.52)  (0.37)  (0.34)  (0.55)  (0.28)  (0.68)  (0.43)  (0.52) 
T/L Partner  -0.80  0.33  -2.01***  -0.27  -0.18  -2.43***  -0.046  -0.32  0.65*  -1.64*** 
  (0.50)  (0.33)  (0.52)  (0.37)  (0.45)  (0.66)  (0.28)  (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.43) 
T/L Reporter  0.11  -3.80  0.96**  3.06  -0.51**  -1.20***  -2.86***  -4.02  -0.16  -2.55*** 
  (0.76)  (5.42)  (0.41)  (2.00)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.98)  (3.49)  (1.13)  (0.98) 
NMS-EU15 Integration    -0.12  -0.044  0.42**  0.26  0.019  0.22    0.19  0.53** 
    (0.20)  (0.28)  (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.38)  (0.21)    (0.19)  (0.25) 
Intra NMS Integration    -0.39  -0.92**  0.17  -0.66  -1.35**  0.049    -0.39  0.43 
    (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.62)  (0.41)    (0.51)  (0.43) 
Association Agreement  0.42*  0.27  0.93***  0.33  0.96***  1.12***  0.37  0.53**  0.51  0.068 
  (0.23)  (0.39)  (0.19)  (0.30)  (0.18)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.43)  (0.16) 
FTA EFTA  0.17  0.51  1.39***  0.33  1.50***  1.85***  0.35  0.073  0.70  0.45 
  (0.49)  (0.51)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.49)  (0.30)    (0)  (0.43) 
CEFTA  0.66**  0.12    0.29      0.52**    -1.29**  0.33 
  (0.28)  (0.24)    (0.24)      (0.24)    (0.54)  (0.23) 
BAFTA      1.00    1.03  -0.12         
      (1.07)    (0.94)  (1.07)         
FTA with Turkey  0.76  0.33  1.12*  0.76*  1.15**  1.17  0.91**  -94.9***  -18.9**  0.57 
  (0.68)  (0.42)  (0.57)  (0.44)  (0.55)  (0.79)  (0.45)  (8.33)  (8.93)  (0.52) 
FTA with Israel  -0.11  -0.25    -0.18      0.13  -0.11  -0.25  0.073 
  (0.81)  (0.44)    (0.44)      (0.44)  (0.64)  (0.43)  (0.51) 
FTA with Croatia              -0.79       
              (0.62)       
Baltics/CEFTA FTA  0.041  0.19  0.16  0.34  0.35  -0.081  0.15    0.026  0.94** 
  (0.55)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.37)  (0.27)    (0.27)  (0.41) 
FTA with Albania  0.91              -0.45     
  (0.97)              (1.11)     
FTA with Macedonia  -1.24*              -1.79    -1.29** 
  (0.74)              (1.11)    (0.54) 
FTA with Ukraine      0.56               
      (1.08)               
Constant  -55.7***  -139***  -126***  -67.0***  -71.1***  -80.1***  -49.8***  -119***  -94.9***  -18.9** 
  (13.1)  (10.7)  (11.0)  (5.69)  (6.72)  (12.6)  (6.02)  (21.4)  (8.33)  (8.93) 
                     
                     
Observations  1115  994  896  1019  838  969  1185  1147  824  963 
R-squared  0.080  0.385  0.456  0.304  0.400  0.331  0.302  0.179  0.419  0.191 
FE F-stat.  13.4  20.8  13.4  42.1  14.7  6.72  23.5  18.4  28.6  23.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   19
Table 4. The fixed effects estimates for bilateral exports of particular CEE countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  Bulgaria  Czech 
Republic 
Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
                     
GDP Partner  -0.17  0.90***  2.09***  1.04***  1.85***  1.30***  0.40**  0.99***  0.82**  0.050 
  (0.28)  (0.18)  (0.50)  (0.20)  (0.55)  (0.38)  (0.19)  (0.25)  (0.40)  (0.22) 
GDP Reporter  2.56***  2.91***  2.92***  2.49***  1.01**  0.80*  0.99***  4.74***  1.03*  2.96*** 
  (0.43)  (0.50)  (0.61)  (0.28)  (0.43)  (0.47)  (0.23)  (0.60)  (0.58)  (0.35) 
T/L Partner  -0.51  0.59***  -0.94  0.50**  -0.27  -0.87  0.28  0.71**  1.09***  0.79*** 
  (0.36)  (0.21)  (0.62)  (0.22)  (0.57)  (0.55)  (0.25)  (0.34)  (0.41)  (0.23) 
T/L Reporter  2.91***  0.52  1.46***  2.60*  0.49  -0.33  -3.54***  -10.5***  -2.16  1.29** 
  (0.60)  (3.80)  (0.50)  (1.43)  (0.35)  (0.24)  (0.83)  (3.12)  (1.49)  (0.63) 
NMS-EU15 Integration    0.44***  -0.062  0.51***  0.47  0.53  0.48***    0.78***  0.18 
    (0.14)  (0.34)  (0.16)  (0.38)  (0.33)  (0.18)    (0.27)  (0.17) 
Intra NMS Integration    0.15  -0.24  0.33  -0.018  -0.40  0.50    0.20  0.48* 
    (0.36)  (0.56)  (0.32)  (0.64)  (0.54)  (0.35)    (0.73)  (0.27) 
Association Agreement  0.69***  0.082  0.58**  0.049  0.21  0.78***  0.10  0.78***  0.31  -0.13 
  (0.19)  (0.29)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.61)  (0.11) 
FTA EFTA  0.43  -0.26  0.68  -0.11  1.21**  2.06***  0.32  0.19  -0.29  0.46** 
  (0.40)  (0.37)  (0.47)  (0.24)  (0.50)  (0.43)  (0.25)  (0.41)  (0.75)  (0.24) 
CEFTA  0.51**  0.37**    0.32*      0.99***  0.91***  0.49  0.28* 
  (0.23)  (0.17)    (0.18)      (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.35)  (0.15) 
BAFTA      2.26*    1.29  1.17         
      (1.34)    (1.49)  (0.92)         
FTA with Turkey  0.57  0.37  -0.21  0.36  0.65  1.01  0.93**  0.65  0.52  0.17 
  (0.56)  (0.31)  (0.72)  (0.33)  (0.81)  (0.68)  (0.39)  (0.57)  (0.58)  (0.35) 
FTA with Israel  0.58  -0.076    -0.15      0.57  0.17  -0.30  0.37 
  (0.66)  (0.33)    (0.33)      (0.38)  (0.62)  (0.61)  (0.34) 
FTA with Croatia              0.38       
              (0.53)       
Baltics/CEFTA FTA  -0.26  0.73***  0.15  0.12  0.34  0.074  1.15***    0.19  1.63*** 
  (0.45)  (0.19)  (0.33)  (0.21)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.23)    (0.39)  (0.22) 
FTA with Albania  -0.12              0.083     
  (0.80)              (1.06)     
FTA with Macedonia  -0.15              1.71    -0.60* 
  (0.61)              (1.07)    (0.36) 
FTA with Ukraine      -0.083               
      (1.35)               
Constant  -45.2***  -82.1***  -110***  -73.9***  -61.4***  -44.4***  -27.9***  -138***  -36.4***  -57.5*** 
  (10.1)  (7.38)  (12.6)  (3.83)  (8.98)  (10.4)  (5.04)  (18.8)  (10.9)  (5.60) 
                     
Observations  1217  1096  966  1119  1040  997  1216  1370  967  1029 
R-squared  0.058  0.339  0.250  0.420  0.113  0.182  0.304  0.136  0.134  0.327 
FE F-stat.  9.07  20.8  8.28  18.4  7.34  10.7  19.0  10.8  8.22  19.8 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 